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“It is not impossible to conceive the surprising liberty that the Americans enjoy;
some idea may likewise be formed of their extreme equality; but the political activity that
pervades the United States must be seen in order to be understood. No sooner do you set
foot upon American ground than you are stunned by a kind of tumult; a confused clamor
is heard on every side, and a thousand simultaneous voices demand the satisfaction of
their social wants. Everything is in motion around you; here the people of one quarter of
a town are met to decide upon the building of a church; there the election of a
representative is going on; a little farther, the delegates of a district are hastening to the
town in order to consult upon some local improvements; in another place, the laborers of
a village quit their plows to deliberate upon the project of a road or a public school.
Meetings are called for the sole purpose of declaring their disapprobation of the conduct
of government; while in other assemblies citizens salute the authorities of the day as the
fathers of their country. . .”
Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. I, p. 259 (Alfred A. Knopf,
1945).

“Publics live in milieux but they can transcend them – individually by intellectual
effort; socially by public action. By reflection and debate and by organized action, a
community of publics comes to feel itself and comes in fact to be active at points of
structural relevance.
“But members of a mass exist in milieux and cannot get out of them, either by
mind or by activity, except – in the extreme case – under the ‘organized spontaneity’ of
the bureaucrat on a motorcycle. We have not yet reached the extreme case, but
observing metropolitan man in the American mass we can surely see the psychological
preparation for it. . . .
“On the one hand, there is the increased scale and centralization of the structure
of decision; and, on the other, the increasingly narrow sorting of men into milieux. From
both sides, there is the increased dependence upon the formal media of communication,
including those of education itself. But the man in the mass does not gain a transcending
view from these media; instead he gets his experience stereotyped, and then he gets sunk
further by that experience. He cannot detach himself in order to observe, must less to
evaluate, what he is experiencing, much less what he is not experiencing. Rather than
that internal discussion we call reflection, he is accompanied through his life-experience
with a sort of unconscious, echoing monologue. He has no projects of his own: he
fulfills the routines that exist. He does not transcend whatever he is at any moment,
because he does not, he cannot, transcend his daily milieux. He is not truly aware of his
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own daily experience and of its actual standards: he drifts, he fulfills his habits, his
behavior a result of a planless mixture of the confused standards and the uncriticized
expectations that he has taken over from others whom he no longer really knows or
trusts, if indeed he ever really did.”
C Wright Mills, THE POWER ELITE pp. 321-322 (1956).

I. C. Wright Mills Is Alive And Well Today.
Writing in the mid-1950s, well into the constitutional regime established by the
Supreme Court’s ratification of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal program, C. Wright Mills
explored the fundamental distinction between a community of publics and a mass society.
Mills observed that, while a community of publics is “thought to be the seat of all
legitimate power” within classical liberal theory, it is in fact a pure type, a hypothesized
extreme as unknown to actual social practice as is its polar opposite, mass society.1
Reality, argued Mills, falls along a continuum between these extremes, and can be
described only by attending to four distinct dimensions of social practice.
The first dimension is the “ratio of the givers of opinion to the receivers.” In a
community of publics, individuals and groups communicate personally, and the speakers
and listeners are in roughly equal proportion to one another. In mass society, by contrast,
the vast majority of people function as recipients of opinion, impersonally spoken to (or
talked at) by a small group of opinion givers who communicate through the various
institutions of mass media. “In between these extremes there are assemblages and
political rallies, parliamentary sessions, law-court debates, small discussion circles
dominated by one man, open discussion circles with talk moving freely back and forth
among fifty people, and so on.”2
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The second dimension by which Mills’s analysis seeks to differentiate a public
from a mass involves the degree to which both formal and informal structures are in place
to insure that listeners have the “possibility of answering back.”3 In a community of
publics, these structures and conventions, governing who can speak, under what
circumstances and for how long, help to foster discussion and “uphold the wide and
symmetrical formation of opinion.”4 In mass society, by contrast, the givers of opinion
hold an essential monopoly over the process by which communication takes place; as a
consequence, opinion is not influenced by genuine discussion.
The third – and perhaps most important – dimension describes the relationship, if
any, between social discussion, the formation of opinion, and the consequent expression
of that opinion in the form of social action. In a society with a vibrant public, there is
considerable “opportunity for people to act out their opinions collectively,” even when
this effective action is inconsistent with the opinions or commitments of those in
positions of authority.5 In mass society, on the other hand, opportunities to translate
opinion into action are either highly constrained by authority, circumscribed within
narrow structures, or nonexistent.
Finally, Mills suggests that a community of publics is distinguished from mass
society by its degree of autonomy from institutional authority. In its most extreme form,
mass society tends to be deeply penetrated by agents of authority who undermine public
trust and sow suspicion and terror, thereby making difficult or impossible the formation
of opinion through discussion.
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Standing at mid-century, Mills’s judgment was that American society had moved
a considerable distance on the continuum from a community of publics to a mass society.
The popular take on his work has come to center on the concentration of power among a
group of elites located both within government and in allied (private) institutions. For
present purposes, however, the more important elements of his analysis are his
characterizations of the role of voluntary associations in then-contemporary America, his
description of the hyper-segregation of primary groups within the community, and his
account of the mass media. Together, Mills’s assessment of these elements begins to
capture what I have described elsewhere as a diminution of public space.6 It is not my
intention in this brief paper to make the case for Mills’s account of contemporary
American society, athough I believe it largely is accurate and that subsequent events have
moved us even further along the continuum toward mass society. Instead, I wish only to
set out a quick summary of this portion of Mills’s analysis, and then to employ it to frame
some observations about diminished public space and our new constitutional order.
With respect to voluntary associations, Mills’s essential point was that the United
States of the 1950s had few effective vehicles for mediating “between the state and the
economy on the one hand, and the family and the individual in the primary group on the
other.”7 Descriptively, Mills argued that voluntary associations had either become
ineffectual as a means of influencing the decisions of those holding concentrated
authority within the state, the corporations, and the military, or had become larger and
more impersonal in order to remain efficacious. In the latter instance, he asserted, these
associations had become inaccessible to their individual members and thus not amenable
6
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to influence by them. In effect, these voluntary associations, including community
groups, labor unions, local schools and the like, through which Americans traditionally
had turned discussion into opinion and opinion into social action, had either become
irrelevant socially and politically or had themselves become distant concentrations guided
by elites who sold opinion to their mass membership rather than taking the members’
opinions into account.
According to Mills, two consequences flow from the loss of effective voluntary
associations. The first has to do with the ways in which authentic group membership and
genuine discourse help to render individuals reflective, autonomous and capable of
transcending their narrow social positions. In the absence of authentic human
associations, which form the “psychological center” for individuals in a healthy society,
citizens loose the opportunity to shape the thinking and feeling of their fellow citizens
and loose the opportunity to be shaped by the experiences and perspectives of others.8 A
second, related consequence of the diminished public space brought about by the loss of
intermediary associations is a transformation in the practice of politics itself. In Mills’s
account, the unavailability of mediating institutions, and the consequent disconnection of
individuals, families and local communities from “effective units of power,” serves to
transform democratic political practice into a kind of unilateral management of society
from above, in which individuals in their primary groups cease to be a source of public
opinion and cease to play an engaged role in the development of public policy.9
A second component of Mills’s analysis of mid-century America was the
increasing tendency of individuals to live and work in highly segregated social and
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geographic spaces. Although most pronounced in the “bedroom belt” of American
suburbia, this cabining of individual lives within highly fragmented milieux was and is an
abiding feature of life for most people in the United States.
“Sunk in their routines, they do not transcend, even by discussion, much
less by action, their more or less narrow lives. They do not gain a view of
the structure of their society and of their role as a public within it. The
city is a structure composed of such little environments, and the people in
them tend to be detached from one another. The ‘stimulating variety’ of
the city does not stimulate the men and women of ‘the bedroom belt,’ the
one-class suburbs, who can go through life knowing only their own kind.
If they do reach for one another, they do so only thorough stereotypes and
prejudiced images of the creatures of other milieux.”10
These ideas have been taken up recently by the legal academic Jerry Frug and the
social psychologist Richard Sennett.11 They follow Mills by painting a picture of
contemporary urban and suburban America in which individuals lead isolated lives
within narrow social spaces rigidly segregated by class and race. Frug argues that current
government policies promote the division of American metropolitan areas “into districts
that are so different from each other they seem to be different worlds.” In his view, these
divisions diminish the potential of cities to be places where “the being together of
strangers” can take place. Employing the work of Sennett, Frug explains that such
avoidance is adolescent because, like adolescents who “fear being overwhelmed by life’s
painful uncertainties and complexities,” it permits people to “organize their lives to
10
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preclude exposure to the unknown or the bewildering.”12 As a consequence, individuals
once again loose the opportunity to absorb the perspectives and experiences of others in
the socially mediated process by which each person develops his or her own sense of self.
The third and final element in Mills’s account of the transformation of the
American public into a mass society is his assessment of the mass media. Tushnet also
discusses this topic, particularly the absorption of the news media into the entertainment
function. While recognizing that this process has influenced the behavior of public
officials by encouraging them to craft their messages (and their policies) to play to the
strengths of the medium, he mostly emphasizes the consumer’s experience of politics as
depicted through the mass media as “a soap opera of some modest entertainment value
but without much effect on the lives of the American people.”13
Mills’s analysis, by contrast, does not focus on the trivialization of politics, but
rather on the impact that the mass media have on those who are its consumers. The
media, often the dominant source of information about one’s own community, other
communities and the country as a whole, had become increasingly powerful in the United
States of the 1950s, a society with rigid class and race segregation and few effective
voluntary associations to mediate between primary groups and central institutions. Given
this power, Mills was especially concerned that the print and broadcast media had
become an instrument through which the powerful few could deliver opinions to a
passive mass society incapable of answering back. In addition to concerns about the
accuracy of the information conveyed and about the concentration of media outlets in few
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hands, Mills argued that the mass media fostered a sort of “psychological illiteracy” in
which
“[v]ery little of what we think we know of the social realities of the world
have we found out first-hand. Most of the ‘pictures in our heads’ we have
gained from these media – even to the point where we often do not really
believe what we see before us until we read about it in the paper or hear
about it on the radio.”14
Given the continued decline of effective voluntary associations, the persistence of
hyper-segregation, and the expanding role of the media in shaping our understandings of
ourselves and our fellow citizens, there is very little reason to believe that Americans
today are any more psychologically literate than we were a half century ago. Indeed,
with the possible exception of the internet, it is likely that contemporary society offers
individuals considerably fewer opportunities for first-hand social interaction with others
not in their primary group than did the America depicted in The Power Elite.

II. A Constitutional Order For Mass Society.
In his new manuscript Mark Tushnet has described a constitutional order for a
society with dwindling public space. He characterizes the animating principles of this
constitutional order as “chastened” versions of the values that guided the previous New
Deal/Great Society order. Policy outcomes are said to reflect moderately conservative
preferences for market-based approaches and notions of individual responsibility.
It is difficult to say whether these constitutional values really do represent the
considered judgment of most Americans, or even whether most Americans have
14
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considered, well-formed opinions about the proper direction of the country. For the most
part, however, Tushnet puts aside questions about the content of the new order, and
chooses to focus instead on the institutions that generate government policy and on the
underlying dynamics that have led those institutions to assume the form he describes.
The story Tushnet tells about the Congress, the Supreme Court, the President, and
the political environment within which they operate is a story that is unsurprising in a
society with little public discourse, few effective mediating institutions, rigid segregation
of primary communities by class and race, and dampened expectations all around that
popular opinion will find expression in social action. Take, for example, his description
of Congress and Congressional politics within the new constitutional order:
“[T]he new order contains a public that does not participate in politics.
This contributes to the development of weak congressional parties, whose
members run campaigns almost as independent entrepreneurs. The
congressional parties may be weak as parties, but they are ideologically
coherent. They are also highly partisan because candidates must obtain
nomination by appealing to the most active, and therefore most partisan,
of their constituents, in districts that have themselves become more
ideologically homogeneous.”15
In this brief passage we have many of the elements that Mills suggests one is
likely to find in a society far down the continuum away from a community of publics. To
say that voters do not participate in politics is, in part, to report that many (most?) in
society understand themselves as receivers and not generators of opinion. That parties
are weak should not surprise us, given that very few mediating institutions – especially
15
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ideologically polygenous institutions – exist in contemporary society. The extreme
partisanship of members of Congress may reflect the stance of a small number of party
activists, but it has far more to do with residential segregation and the attendant
homogenization of Congressional districts. Interest group bargaining may still take place
as a residual effect of embedded New Deal arrangements, but most policy-making at the
national level now results from ideologically-driven behavior on the part of elected
officials that itself is the indirect product of phenomena such a voter dealignment,
alienation and disinterest.
This story, of constitutionalism in a world with a withered public, contrasts
dramatically with the constitutional theory offered by Bruce Ackerman. Like other
constitutional theories rooted in liberal thinking, Ackerman’s version is built upon the
premise of a vibrant community of publics. During periods of ordinary politics,
Ackerman suggests that interest groups are likely to form coalitions, to lobby against the
claims of other interest groups and coalitions, and generally to press their claims in the
hopes that they will find expression in government outcomes. To be sure, Ackerman’s
interest groups, like Madison’s factions, are motivated by self-interest. But, importantly,
they understand themselves as generators of opinion, and they proceed on the hope and
expectation that their preferences will be translated into social action.
Even more striking is the contrast between Ackerman’s constitutional politics and
the politics of Tushnet’s new constitutional order. During constitutional moments,
Ackerman suggests, the people assume a stance as THE PEOPLE, as a quintessentially
public public. At these moments, a number of factions coalesce into a supermajority
attending to constitutional principle instead of narrow self-interest. Not only is this
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popular assumption of civic responsibility understood as efficacious in the here and now,
it also is treated as binding the practices of future publics and the outcomes of future
governments.
Reasonable people can disagree about whether Ackerman has accurately
described the process by which constitutional regimes have been established and
operationalized in American history. His narrative may or may not capture what
happened following the Civil War and during the New Deal and the Great Society. He
does, however, provide a normative point of view, not only seeking to explain how one
generation can bind the choices of later ones, but also founding that solution in classical
liberal theory.
Tushnet’s account of the new constitutional order, on the other hand, does not
attempt to lay a normative foundation for either the adoption of chastened constitutional
values or the institutional arrangements that currently prevail.16 Such a foundation might
be discoverable, although I suspect it would not be within traditional liberal theory. But
the fundamental absence I have identified – the absence of a functioning community of
publics – means that governmental actors within the new constitutional order cannot
legitimately base their authority upon claims of popular sovereignty.
Even more to the point, this absence makes me far less sanguine than Tushnet
about the possibilities for what he terms a “modest progressive reformist element in the
new constitutional order.”17 One passing example of the sort of democratic
experimentalism he envisions, the development of drug courts, is instead an example of
the profound limits on progressive government activity in a social and political
16
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environment characterized by diminished public space. Tushnet offers the example
mostly to flag the danger that democratic experimentalism may cause localized
deliberations to “end with an apparent though false consensus, elicited by the
participants’ agreement, often unstated, to take some possible solutions off the table as
unreasonable or unachievable.”18 In the case of the drug court movement, this narrowing
of the range of possible solutions resulted in undermining calls for the decriminalization
(or medicalization) of drugs.
As I have made clear in an article on the subject of drug courts, the inattention to
decriminalization as a policy response to the problem of drug addiction has had less to do
with a premature narrowing of public discussion than with the absence of genuine public
discourse altogether in this area.19 In my previous work I have sought to demonstrate that
the drug court movement (and the War on Drugs out of which it emerged) has been
driven by a perverse media caricature of drug addiction as a problem largely confined to
inner city persons of color, and by the bureaucratic needs of officials in the criminal and
public health systems. Neither the specific negotiations that have led to the establishment
of drug courts in most American jurisdictions, nor the larger conversations about drug
policy and criminal enforcement policy that have framed this movement, have included
anything like the broad array of perspectives and experiences that one would expect to
find in a process that is both democratic and progressive. Before such a public
conversation can take place with respect to this or many other issues of pressing
importance in contemporary society, considerable advance work will have to take place
directed toward building the very public spaces within which the various stakeholders can
18
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meet to work out their competing pictures of social reality. I suspect that a society in
which a community of publics really existed would hammer out a very different drug
policy than the one we currently have, and a very different constitutional order than the
one Tushnet has described. Whether such a community of publics is possible, I leave to a
future discussion.
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